Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in European Ownership by Bennedsen, Morten & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in European
Ownership






Right   
Center for Economic Institutions 



















Center for Economic 
Institutions 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Institute of Economic Research 
Hitotsubashi University 






“Incentive and Entrenchment Effects 
in European Ownership” 
Morten Bennedsen and   
Kasper Meisner Nielsen 
 
November 2009 Incentive and Entrenchment Eﬀects in European Ownership∗
Morten Bennedsen†
Copenhagen Business School and CEBR
Kasper Meisner Nielsen‡
Chinese University of Hong Kong and CEBR
March 2009
Abstract: In a large sample of European ﬁrms we analyze the value discount associated
with disproportional ownership structures ﬁrst documented by Claessens et al (2002). Consistent
with a theoretical model of incentives and entrenchment eﬀects, we ﬁnd higher value discount
in family ﬁrms, in ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow concentration, and in industries with higher amenity
value. Furthermore, the discount is higher in countries with good investor protection and higher
for dual class shares than for pyramids. We ﬁnd no impact on operating performance, likelihood
of bankruptcy, dividend policy, or growth. Finally, we discuss policy implications of these
ﬁndings.
JEL classifications: G30, G32, G34, and G38
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Dual Class Shares, Pyramids, EU Company Law
∗We would like to thank Raﬃ Amit, Renee Adams, Ron Anderson, Laurence Booth, Henrik Cronqvist, Daniel
Ferreira, Rudi Fahlenbrach, Mark Georgen, Denis Gromb, Ulrich Hege, Peter H¨ ogfeldt, Randall Morch, David
Reeb, J¨ org Rocholl, Thomas Rønde, Matti Suominen, Dogan Tirtiroglu, Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, Belen Villa-
longa, Daniel Wolfenzon and participants at the conferences “Corporate Governance in Firms with Concentrated
Ownership” and “Politics and Corporate Governance” at Copenhagen Business School, “EFM Symposium on
European Corporate Governance” at Leeds University Business School, “FMA European Meetings” in Siena,
“Conference on Financial System Modernisation and Economic Growth in Europe” in Berlin, “Latest Devel-
opment in Corporate Governance” at London Business School, “FMA Meeting” in Orlando, ECGI Corporate
Governance Conference at Said Business School, Oxford University, as well as seminar participants at Copen-
hagen Business School, Melbourne Business School, University of Aarhus, Alberta Business School, and University
of Copenhagen for helpful comments and suggestions. We would further like to thank Jonas Herby, Rune Midjord,
and David Tønners for excellent research assistance. This project has been supported by the Center for Economic
and Business Research, the Danish Social Science Research Foundation, the Danish Centre for Accounting and Fi-
nance (D-CAF), and the Economic Policy Research Network. An earlier version of this paper was titled “Principle
of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe.”
†Email: mb.eco@cbs.dk.
‡Email: nielsen@cuhk.edu.hk.Incentive and Entrenchment Eﬀects in European Ownership
Abstract: In a large sample of European ﬁrms we analyze the value discount associated
with disproportional ownership structures ﬁrst documented by Claessens et al (2002). Consistent
with a theoretical model of incentives and entrenchment eﬀects, we ﬁnd higher value discount
in family ﬁrms, in ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow concentration, and in industries with higher amenity
value. Furthermore, the discount is higher in countries with good investor protection and higher
for dual class shares than for pyramids. We ﬁnd no impact on operating performance, likelihood
of bankruptcy, dividend policy, or growth. Finally, we discuss policy implications of these
ﬁndings.
JEL classifications: G30, G32, G34, and G38
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Dual Class Shares, Pyramids, EU Company Law1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Concentration of corporate ownership and control is the norm in most countries around the world
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1999). In general, ownership concentration
generates two counteracting eﬀects on the governance of corporations: an incentive eﬀect, which
makes monitoring of management more eﬃcient; and, an entrenchment eﬀect, which makes it
easier for opportunistic owners to expropriate minority owners (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
1988). In support of the incentive and entrenchment story, a number of papers starting with
Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) have established empirically a negative correlation
between ﬁrm value and disproportional ownership structures.1
Claessens et al. (2002) interpret the positive correlation between concentration of cash ﬂow
rights and ﬁrm value as the result of ownership concentration having provided better managerial
incentives; they interpret the negative correlation between disproportional ownership structure
and ﬁrm value as evidence of entrenched owners. The main contribution of the present paper is to
establish a more direct link between the value discount of disproportional ownership structures
and the incentive and entrenchment eﬀects. To do this we construct a simple model based
on incentive and entrenchment eﬀects that generates a number of testable predictions of the
relationship between disproportional ownership structures and ﬁrm value. The model predicts
that corporations with disproportional ownership structures have lower ﬁrm values, and that the
discounts are larger a) in family-controlled ﬁrms where the incentive problem is absent; b) when
large owners have small cash ﬂow stakes, i.e., where disproportionality provides most added
control for the largest owners; and, c) in ﬁrms with higher amenity value, where the scope for
entrenchment is larger.
We test these predictions in a sample of more than 4,000 corporations from fourteen Eu-
ropean countries. A novel contribution of our cross-country approach is that it allows us to
use country ﬁxed eﬀects and, thereby, control for eﬀects that are constant at the country level
and likely to correlate with the variables of interest. One prominent example of such an eﬀect
is investor protection, which both aﬀects ownership concentration and ﬁrm value (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000, 2002). Empirically, we ﬁnd large and signiﬁcant
value discounts of disproportional ownership structures in Europe and conﬁrm that this discount
1We use the term disproportional ownership structure to characterize ownership structures where the distri-
bution of control (voting rights) is more concentrated than the distribution of income rights (cash ﬂow rights).
This is typical in ﬁrms with dual class shares or pyramidal ownership structures.
1is higher in a) family ﬁrms, b) ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow concentration, and c) industries with
high amenity values.
Our analysis also provides three additional insights into the consequences of disproportional
ownership structures. First, we ﬁnd that dual class shares are associated with a signiﬁcantly
larger value discount than pyramids and other separating mechanisms. In addition, we show
that these diﬀerences are related to a lower takeover frequency, operating performance, payout
r a t i o ,a n dg r o w t hi na s s e t so fﬁrms with dual class shares. Second, the value discount is posi-
tively correlated with the degree of investor protection, implying that the discount is higher in
Northern Europe than in Southern Europe. Third, we investigate the overall eﬀect of dispropor-
tionality on various alternative measures of corporate performance. We show that there are no
diﬀerences in terms of operating performance, likelihood of going bankrupt, dividend policy, or
ﬁrm growth. Thus, whereas our results are consistent with the theory that disproportional own-
ership structures reduce ﬁrm value, we ﬁnd little evidence to suggest that corporate resources
are used less eﬃciently. From a theoretical viewpoint this may indicate that controlling owners
extract a disproportional part of the surplus in the ﬁrms they control after operations have been
carried out.
Although our results are consistent with incentive and entrenchment eﬀects of concentrated
ownership, the potential endogeneity of ownership in relation to ﬁrm performance makes it hard
to give these results a causal interpretation. The lack of additional evidence using alternative
measures of performance also raises the concern that the valuation results might be due to ei-
ther omitted variable bias, measurement bias, or reverse causality. Generally there exist two
approaches to shed light on this issue. The ﬁrst approach uses instrument variables to establish
causality. Two conditions must be satisﬁed for this strategy to work. First, the instrument
should be correlated with the endogenous regressor for reasons we can verify and explain. Sec-
ond, the instrument in itself should not be related to ﬁrm value. As the second condition is hard
to satisfy, ﬁnding good instruments for ownership is known to be a diﬃcult task. In the absence
of good instruments, a second approach is to directly address speciﬁc endogeneity problems.
Whereas carefully selected instruments can deal with all possible endogeneity stories, the draw-
back of the second approach is that it only caters to those considered. Despite this limitation,
the second approach still provides valuable insights–in particular, if good instruments are hard
to ﬁnd (Angrist and Kruger 2001).
Prior literature records few attempts to instrument ownership concentration. Lins (2003)
2uses proxies for ﬁrm volatility (beta) and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008) use proxies for
private beneﬁts of control as instruments for ownership concentration in ﬁrms with dual class
shares. The key concern with these instruments is that they are likely to aﬀect ﬁrm value and,
thereby, not meet the exclusion restriction (Adams and Ferriera 2008).2 Moreover, from the
microeconometrics literature, we know that without a good instrument we cannot be certain
that the uncovered relationship is causal (Angrist and Kruger 2001).
In this paper, we therefore directly address the speciﬁc endogeneity problems that ﬁgure
most prominently in the literature. Given, in prior literature, the importance of endogeneity
of ownership and the lack of good instruments for ownership, this paper’s evidence strengthens
the causal interpretation of the uncovered value discount on disproportional ownership. In
particular, we examine whether the value discount can be explained by omitted variable bias
(missing takeover premia, or protection of private beneﬁts); measurement bias (missing voting
or block premia, or low liquidity); or reverse causality (ﬁrms with low ﬁr mv a l u ec h o o s ea
disproportional ownership structure). To rule out these speciﬁc endogeneity stories, we make
use of the cross-country and cross-industry variation in our sample and establish empirically
based contradictions for each story. To this end, our results support the causal interpretation of
the observed negative correlation between disproportional ownership and ﬁrm value as evidence
of incentive and entrenchment problems.
Overall, our results have important implications for the ongoing harmonization of EU com-
pany law. Regulations that promote proportional ownership structures may have diﬀerent eﬀects
in Northern Europe, where investor protection is high, than in countries with lower investor pro-
tection. In the absence of solid evidence that ﬁrms with disproportional ownership structures
use corporate resources less eﬃciently, policymakers must believe that ﬁrm value is a legitimate
policy goal. Thus, our analysis does support the argument that, currently, o n es i z ed o e sn o tﬁt
all with respect to harmonizing the company law in Europe.
2As an example, the dummy for whether the family name appears in the ﬁrm name used by Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2008) increases the frequency of family control and family ownership. Although family ownership does
increase the use of disproportional ownership structures, it also aﬀects ﬁrm value directly (see, e.g., the recent
survey by Bertrand and Schoar 2006). Thus, it is contestable whether this instrument satisﬁes the exclusion
restriction. We believe that the same critique can be raised against other proposed instruments, although this
can only be tested in cases where the instruments overidentify (i.e., exceed) the variables of interest. In fact,
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008) provide an overidentiﬁcation test to validate that their instruments can be
considered exogenous in the second stage. In all cases the overidentiﬁcation tests do not reject the exogeneity
tests. However, as noted by Staiger and Stock (1997), overidentiﬁcation tests are misleading if instruments are
weak, and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008, p.37) acknowledge that their ”F-statistics are low enough to suggest
a possible weak instrument problem”.
3In the next section, we present our data on ownership concentration in Western Europe. In
Section 3 we provide a simple model of incentive and entrenchment eﬀects, derive a number of
testable results, and take them to the data for empirical tests. Section 4 provides additional
insight by analysing various disproportional mechanisms, the interaction with investor protec-
tion, and alternative measures of corporate performance. In Section 5, we address endogeneity
issues. In the ﬁnal section, we relate our ﬁndings to the ongoing policy debate about promoting
proportional ownership structures for publicly traded European ﬁrms.
Related literature
A number of studies have analyzed the consequences of disproportional ownership structures.
In a sample of 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian countries, Claessens et
al. (2002) show that ownership concentration increases ﬁrm value, but that separation of cash
ﬂow and control decreases ﬁrm value. Lins (2003) investigates ﬁrm performance and managerial
ownership in 1000+ corporations in eighteen emerging markets and ﬁnds that ﬁrm value is lower
whenever votes are more concentrated than cash ﬂow. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) analyze the
impact of controlling minority shareholders on ﬁrm value and ﬁrm performance in a sample of
309 publicly traded Swedish ﬁrms. They show that the presence of controlling minority owners
decreases ﬁrm value and performance, an eﬀect that is most signiﬁcant when these controlling
minority shareholders are families. In a sample of 174 Finnish ﬁrms, Maury and Pajuste (2004)
document that ﬁrm value is lower when large owners control ﬁrms through disproportional own-
ership structures. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008) analyze a sample of U.S. ﬁrms with dual
class shares and show that the relationship of ﬁrm value to managerial ownership concentration,
measured with cash ﬂow, is positive and concave, whereas the relationship of ﬁrm value to voting
concentration is negative and convex. In a recent and comprehensive survey of this literature,
Adams and Ferreira (2008) conclude that disproportional ownership structures correlate nega-
tively with ﬁrm value but that a universal causal link from control enhancing mechanisms to
ﬁrm outcome has yet to be established.
Compared with the studies above, our contribution–in the context of Western European
ﬁrms–is to: a) provide evidence consistent with that the value discount is driven by incentive
and entrenchment eﬀects controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects; b) address the endogeneity con-
cerns that ﬁgure prominent in the literature; and c) disentangle the impact of dual class shares
4from pyramids.3
2 Data and Sample Selection
T h es a m p l eo fﬁrm-level ownership, accounting, and market data from fourteen Western Eu-
ropean countries is constructed by combining two diﬀerent sources. The data on ownership
structure and ﬁrm organization are primarily obtained from Faccio and Lang’s (2002) study of
ﬁrms in Western Europe. We have extended their data set with ﬁr m si nD e n m a r ka n dS w e d e n . 4
Therefore, we have ownership information on 5,521 Western European ﬁrms. All ownership vari-
ables are deﬁned according to Faccio and Lang (2002), where the ownership measures represent
the ultimate ownership of voting and cash ﬂow rights.5 We merge this data with accounting and
market data from Worldscope from 1996 to 1998. We use the name of the ﬁrm as the identiﬁer
between the two data sets. We have checked for changes in ﬁrm name and de-listings to increase
the accuracy of this matching procedure. However, not all listed ﬁrms in Europe are included in
Worldscope.6 The total number of ﬁrms for which we have ownership, accounting, and market
information is therefore reduced from 5,521 to 4,410. In the empirical analysis, we control for a
wide range of ﬁrm characteristics that are likely to aﬀect ﬁrm performance. Unfortunately, not
all ﬁrms in Worldscope report all of the control variables; we therefore exclude 314 ﬁrms where
control variables are missing and nine ﬁrms with assets under $ 1 million. Thus, the empirical
analysis is carried out with 4,096 observations. This sample is a representative subsample of
Faccio and Lang’s (2002) data with respect to the employment of disproportionality mechanisms.
I nT a b l e1 ,w ec l a s s i f yﬁrms with a disproportional ownership structure into three groups based
on the underlying mechanism: dual class shares, pyramidal ownership, and other mechanisms
(including voting caps and golden shares, among others). A ﬁrm is classiﬁed as having a pyra-
midal ownership structure if it has an ultimate owner who controls the ﬁrm indirectly through
3Claessens et al. (2002) also attempt to measure the importance of diﬀerent separating mechanisms. However,
their sample is dominated by pyramidal ownership in Asian business groups, and they, therefore, are not able to
disentangle which disproportionality instrument is associated with the highest valuation discount. Our previous
working paper, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2005), is to our knowledge the ﬁrst study that disentangles the impact
of various instruments. More recently, Villalonga and Amit (2008) have shown similar results using data on U.S.
corporations.
4The ownership structures of Danish and Swedish ﬁrms are obtained from Greens and SIS Agarservice, re-
spectively. Danish ﬁrms were not included in Faccio and Lang’s (2002) study, whereas we were able to extend the
number of Swedish ﬁrms from 245 to 335.
5This includes the ultimate ownership of private ﬁrms’ ownership of listed ﬁrms in our sample.
6In particular, only 170 out of 604 listed Spanish ﬁrms are included.
5another corporation that it does not fully control.7 As a consequence, we can only evaluate the
eﬀect of pyramidal ownership for ﬁrms below the top level of the corporate pyramid, as our data
do not identify ﬁrms at the top layer. Table 1 shows that the share of ﬁrms with dual class
shares, pyramidal ownership, cross-ownership and other mechanisms of separating votes from
cash ﬂow varies greatly across countries.
3 Incentive and Entrenchment Eﬀects
3.1 A simple model of incentive and entrenchment eﬀects
In this subsection we present a simple illustrative model based on incentive and entrenchment
eﬀects. The model provides us with refutable predictions that are investigated empirically in
the following subsections.8 Consistent with our empirical strategy, we assume that ownership is
exogenous to incentive and entrenchment eﬀects.9
The model has three dates and three types of agents: a manager, m; a controlling owner, o;
and a group of passive non-controlling owners. The manager creates value, v,i nt h eﬁrm. At
date zero, the manager chooses to divert an amount of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow, em




2. At date 1, the controlling owner chooses two actions: ﬁrst, she monitors the
manager (too be speciﬁed below) and, second, she diverts corporate resources, eo
d,a tap r i v a t e
eﬀort cost of 1
2eo
d
2. We assume that both types of diversion are observable but non-veriﬁable
to third parties; however, monitoring increases the likelihood that the manager is caught in a
veriﬁable way. Finally, at date 2, the residual cash ﬂow is distributed equally among all owners.
The controlling owner receives a fraction, c, equivalent to her share of the nominal income rights,
and the non-controlling owners receive the rest.
Given cash ﬂow rights, c, the controlling owner possesses control rights (votes) of c + d
where d is the degree of disproportional ownership structure. If the controlling owner has a
large percentage of votes - i.e., c + d is high - she can almost unilaterally decide on actions,
7For example, if a family owns 25 percent of Firm X, which in turn owns 20 percent of Firm Y, then Y is
controlled through a pyramid. If Firm X holds 100 percent of Firm Y, then Y is a subsidiary and not a pyramid.
In case the ﬁrm is classiﬁed as a pyramid, the ownership of votes is measured by the weakest-link approach,
whereas the ownership of cash ﬂow rights is the product of ownership along the control chain.
8See Burkart and Lee (2008) for a recent survey of alternative theoretical explanations of the economic conse-
quences of separating cash ﬂow and votes.
9The assumption of exogenous ownership structure simpliﬁes our model signiﬁcantly and allow us to focus on
the incentive and entrenchment eﬀects. However, it raises the possibility that we ignore the fact that ﬁrm actions
and value may aﬀect ownership structure. This highlights the importance of addressing reverse causality in our
empirical analysis, which we do in Section 6 below. For a model of endogenous ownership structure, see Almeida
and Wolfenzon (2005).
6such as monitoring the manager or diverting cash ﬂow on her own. If she has fewer votes,
she must negotiate with other owners before taking action. Formally, if the controlling owner
provides eﬀective monitoring eﬀort of eo




2,w h e r en ≡ n(1 − c − d), n(0) = 0, n0 > 0, and n00 > 0. Thus, control through
votes mitigates the owner’s private cost of monitoring the manager. For simplicity, we assume
that the likelihood of catching the manager in a veriﬁable way is p = eo
m, and if the manager is
caught, the cash ﬂow will return to the corporation without further punishment.
In a similar vein, we assume that when the owner does not have absolute control, she must
share part of the diverted cash ﬂow with a supporting group of owners. To be speciﬁcw ea s s u m e
that she has to share a fraction n of the diverted cash ﬂow with the other owners.
With these assumptions, expected residual ﬁrm value (RFV) is the potential ﬁrm value v
less the amount of corporate resources that the owner and the manager divert net of what is
returned to the corporation as a result of monitoring, i.e., RFV = v − eo
d − (1 − p)em
d .
We assume that the marginal private beneﬁt of diverted cash ﬂow, (1 + a), is the same for
both the manager and the owner. However, in line with Demsetz and Lehn (1985), we deﬁne a
as the amenity value and assume it varies across industries. The idea is that a certain amount
of private beneﬁt extraction may be worth more for the controlling owner in industries such as
media, entertainment, and sport.
The expected payoﬀ for the manager, given the controlling owner’s monitoring eﬀort, is:







The controlling owner’s payoﬀ is given by:
πo =( 1+a)(1 − n)eo
d + c(v − eo












In this model, the incentive problem is the dilution of corporate resources by the manager,
and the entrenchment problem is the dilution of corporate resources by the owner. We solve
for a subgame perfect equilibrium and focus on the eﬀect of disproportional ownership on the
incentive and entrenchment problems and the resulting impact on residual ﬁrm value. We focus
on residual ﬁrm value for two reasons. First, residual ﬁrm value, measured through stock prices,
reﬂects the value to the marginal investor and does not include private beneﬁts. Hence, our
model speciﬁcation matches our empirical measure. Second, due to the private eﬀort cost of
diversion and monitoring, ﬁrst best is attained when the residual ﬁrm value is maximized and
the monitoring eﬀort is zero. The following proposition characterizes equilibrium:
7Proposition 1. Equilibrium level of diversion and residual ﬁrm value are:
eo
d =( 1 + a)(1 − n) − c,
em
d =
(1 + n)(1 + a)
1+n +( 1+a)c
,
RFVsc = v − ((1 + a)(1 − n) − c) − (1 − p)(
(1 + a)(1 + n)
1+n +( 1+a)c
).
All proofs are in the Appendix. The amenity value measures the marginal beneﬁto fd i v e r t e d
resources, thus diversion increases in a. When the owner has more control, she has to share fewer
of the diverted resources with other owners. On the other hand, higher cash ﬂow increases the
owner’s share of foregone cash ﬂow. Hence, diversion also increases in the owner’s share of
votes and decreases with her share of cash ﬂow. The interpretation of the equilibrium level of
managerial diversion is more involved since the manager takes into account the monitoring eﬀort






∂n are positive; hence, managerial diversion increases
in the amenity value and decreases in the amount of control that the owner possesses. More
control decreases the monitoring cost, which increases the likelihood that the manager is caught
for a given level of diversion.
In the following subsections, we present propositions 2 through 5 of our model. For each
proposition, we provide empirical tests using both a univariate (Table 3) and a multivariate
approach (Table 4). We measure residual ﬁrm value by the ratio of market value of assets to
book value of assets. Market value is deﬁned as the sum of the market value of common stocks
and the book value of debt and preferred stocks. For ﬁrms with dual class shares, we follow
prior literature and calculate ﬁrm value on the basis of the publicly traded shares. Thus, in
the event that the ﬁrm has an unlisted share class, we mark this to the market price of the
listed share class. We thereby assume that non-traded superior voting shares carry a zero voting
premium. Obviously this assumption implies a valuation bias that, in theory, can drive our
empirical results. However, we reject this possibility in Section 6 because it is inconsistent with
the existing evidence on the value of control across countries. Concentration of ownership is
measured as the amount of residual income rights and votes that the largest owner possesses.10
In all multivariate regression, we estimate a cross-sectional model of the average of the three
10As a robustness check, we have run all regressions focusing on joint ownership held by large owners with an
individual stake of 10 percent or more of the votes. To save space, we are not reporting these regressions; however,
it suﬃces to note that none of our results are sen s i t i v et oa n yo ft h em e a s u r e sw eu s e .
8yearly observations from 1996 to 1998.11 This is done because Faccio and Lang’s (2002) data
on the ownership structure in each country are not collected in the same year for all countries.
Thus, we assume that the ownership structure is constant for the period 1996 to 1998 and focus
on the variation between ﬁrms. Moreover, we control for size, leverage (ratio of book value
of debt to book value of assets), asset tangibility, sales growth, and industry eﬀects.12 Table
2 reports descriptive statistics on the country level for all control variables. We also include
both industry- and country-speciﬁce ﬀects. We thereby pick up diﬀerences between industries
and the overall lower valuation of ﬁrms in countries with low investor protection. Further, the
country eﬀects are “ﬁxed eﬀects” to control for country-speciﬁc ﬁrm invariant heterogeneity.
This is important if our basic model omits country-speciﬁc variables that are correlated with
the explanatory variables, such as investor protection and/or takeover activity.
3.2 Value discount on disproportional ownership structures
The basic cost and beneﬁt of a disproportional ownership structure is characterized by:
Proposition 2. A more disproportional ownership structure
a) decreases the incentive problem,
b) increases the entrenchment problem,
c) decreases residual ﬁrm value.
The beneﬁt of disproportional ownership is that it improves incentives to monitor, because
the controlling owner wastes less eﬀort on negotiating with other owners. Since the incentive
to monitor improves, the manager ends up diverting fewer corporate resources, which ceteris
paribus increases residual ﬁrm value. The cost of a disproportional ownership structure is that a
self-interested controlling owner needs to distribute a smaller share of diluted corporate resources
to other owners. Therefore, she has stronger incentives to divert resources which ceteris paribus
decreases residual ﬁrm value. Neither part a) nor part b) is easy to prove empirically, since
it is hard to measure the two eﬀects in isolation from each other. Part c), however, yields
that the enlargement of the entrenchment problem dominates the improvement of the incentive
11In unreported regressions, we have run all regressions using the cross-sectional data from 1996, 1997, and
1998 individually, rather than the average of the period from 1996 to 1998. In short, our results are not aﬀected
in any meaningful way by taking the average over three years.
12In addition, we could have included return on assets as a control variable in the valuation regression. Including
this variable in a robustness check, has no eﬀect on our results. As we later proceeded to evaluate the eﬀect of
disproportional ownership structures on operating performance, we chose to present the results without return on
assets as a control variable.
9problem implying that disproportionality reduces residual ﬁrm value. Thus, the model predicts
a negative relation between disproportionality and residual ﬁrm value.
Panel A in Table 3 provides univariate evidence in support of Proposition 2. The average
market-to-book (MB) ratio for ﬁrms with a proportional ownership structure is 1.36, whereas
the MB ratio for ﬁrms with a disproportional ownership structure is 1.17. This diﬀerence of 0.19
in the MB ratios is economically large (14 percent) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level.
Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 show multivariate evidence conﬁrming Proposition 2. In Model 1
we include a dummy variable for whether a given ﬁrm has a disproportional ownership structure
such as dual class shares, pyramidal ownership structure, and cross-ownership. Firms with
disproportional ownership structures have lower ﬁrm value. The eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level and very large: the average ﬁrm with disproportional ownership structure
has a 0.18 lower MB ratio than ﬁrms without. Given a sample mean of 1.28, this implies that
the average discount on ﬁrm value is around 14 percent. This is consistent with the evidence
for Asian ﬁrms provided by Claessens et al. (2002).
Model 2 analyzes the degree of disproportionality,d e ﬁned as the largest owner’s share of votes
minus her share of residual cash ﬂow. The degree of disproportionality is almost signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level and the marginal eﬀect is large: a 10 percent increase in the wedge between
control and cash ﬂow of the largest owner decreases ﬁrm value, with 3 percent on average around
t h es a m p l em e a no f1 . 2 8 .
Collectively Models 1 and 2 provide evidence consistent with Proposition 2 of our theoretical
model. At ﬁrst glance, it may seem at odds, however, with the theory that the estimated
eﬀect appears to be stronger for the disproportionality dummy as compared to the degree of
disproportionality. We believe this diﬀerence can be attributed to the observability of the two
measures: Whereas the marginal investors can easily observe whether a ﬁrm has dual class shares
or pyramidal ownership, it requires signiﬁcantly more insight to observe the exact ultimate
ownership distribution of cash ﬂow and votes (which will require information about layers of
corporate ownership, cross ownership, and the exact distribution of shares within diﬀerent share
classes).
3.3 Value discount on disproportionality in owner-managed ﬁrms
O u rn e x tr e s u l tf o c u s e so nt h ee ﬀect of disproportionality in owner-managed ﬁrms.
10Proposition 3. T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of a disproportional ownership structure on residual ﬁrm
value is larger in owner-managed ﬁrms.
In owner-managed ﬁrms, the controlling owner has no incentive to monitor her alter ego,
the manager. In this case, disproportionality does not improve the eﬃciency of monitoring.
Without the beneﬁcial incentive eﬀect, residual ﬁrm value is lower in owner-managed ﬁrms with
disproportional ownership because of the persistence of the entrenchment problem. We therefore
expect to see a larger value discount of disproportionality in owner-managed ﬁrms.
Family ﬁrms are prime examples of owner-managed ﬁrms. Panel B in Table 3 shows that the
average value discount related to disproportional ownership structures is more than three times
larger in family-controlled ﬁr m st h a ni nn o n - f a m i l yﬁrms. This large diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. To push the argument further, we look at family ﬁrms where
the manager is a member of the controlling family and ﬁnd the value discount to be almost ﬁve
times larger than in non-family ﬁrms.13 The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
In Model 3 of Table 4, we introduce an indicator for family ownership, family controlled (FC),
which takes the value one if the largest ultimate owner is a family. We observe that family-owned
ﬁrms have around 13 percent higher ﬁrm value, but that the value discount on disproportional
ownership is signiﬁcantly larger: the discount for all ﬁrms is 0.14 and the additional discount in
family-owned ﬁrms is 0.19, implying a total value discount in these ﬁrms of 0.33. This eﬀect is
statistically signiﬁcant and equivalent to a discount on ﬁrm value of disproportional ownership
structure of 23 percent.14
We conﬁrm this insight in Model 4, where we interact family control with the degree of
disproportionality. Enlarging the wedge between votes and cash ﬂow is associated with a larger
value discount in family ﬁrms. In addition, we have in unreported regressions interacted dispro-
portionality with an indicator for whether the manager is a member of the controlling family
while controlling for family ownership and management. Consistently, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
larger value discount of disproportionality in family-managed ﬁrms: The estimated coeﬃcient
on the interaction between disproportionality and family manager equals -0.24 (with a p-value
of 4.1 percent). Thus, in addition to a discount for all ﬁrms of 0.15, family managed ﬁrms with
disproportionality have a 0.24 lower MB ratio, which corresponds to a 26 percent lower ﬁrm
value.
13Family managed is deﬁned as family ﬁrms where the CEO, honorary chairman, chairman, or vice-president
is a member of the controlling family.
14Note that family ﬁrms have an average MB ratio of 1.44; thus, a discount of 0.33 corresponds to 23 percent.
113.4 Value discount and low cash ﬂow concentration
Proposition 4 relates the value discount of disproportional ownership to the level of cash ﬂow
concentration.
Proposition 4. T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of a disproportional ownership structure on residual ﬁrm
value is larger in owner-managed ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow concentration.
A controlling owner that possesses a majority of the income and control rights has ultimate
control even without any disproportionality. Thus, we expect to see that the value discounts of
disproportional ownership structures are larger in ﬁrms where the controlling owner possesses
little cash ﬂow. Proposition 4 yields that this is the case in owner-managed ﬁrms. We also
conjecture this to be the case for other ﬁrms; however, we cannot derive close form solutions for
this result when monitoring is positive.
In Panel C of Table 3, we focus only on family ﬁrms and look at average value discount
across the two subgroups with low and high cash ﬂow concentration, respectively. In the latter
group, the eﬀect of disproportionality is small and insigniﬁcant, whereas for family ﬁrms with
dispersed cash ﬂow the value discount on disproportionality is four times larger than for all ﬁrms
(Panel A). This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at a one percent level.
We posit that this result should not be limited to family ﬁrms. In Panel D of Table 3, we
therefore split the total population of ﬁrms according to high or low cash ﬂow concentration and
ﬁnd similar results. Again we ﬁnd a larger discount in the group of ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow
concentration.
Models 5 and 6 in Table 4 provide multivariate evidence related to cash ﬂow concentration.
In Model 5 we add a dummy variable, low cash ﬂow concentration (LCFC), which takes the value
one if the controlling owner’s cash ﬂow stake is smaller than the median cash ﬂow across all
ﬁrms.15 We thereby split the eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures in two: the eﬀect that
is common to all ﬁrms; and an additional eﬀect for ﬁrms where the controlling owner possesses
little cash ﬂow. As Model 5 includes low cash ﬂow concentration and disproportionality, the
interaction eﬀect isolates the additional eﬀect of disproportionality when it provides most added
control for the largest owner.
15Alternatively, we could have interacted the continuous measure of cash ﬂo wc o n c e n t r a t i o nw i t ht h ed i s p r o -
portionality dummy. Consistently, we ﬁnd the largest value discount in ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow concentration
using the continuous measure. However, to ease the exposition of our results, we have chosen the simple dummy
speciﬁcation.
12We ﬁnd that disproportionality reduces ﬁrm value in all family ﬁrms; however, the eﬀect in
ﬁrms where the controlling owner holds little cash ﬂow is larger. The interaction eﬀect is not
statistically signiﬁcant when we use the disproportionality dummy in Model 5, but an F-test
of the combined eﬀect of disproportionality and disproportionality in ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow
concentration is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Consistently, in Model 6 the interaction term
is signiﬁcant at a 5 percent level when we use degree of disproportionality. Thus, we ﬁnd support
for Proposition 4 in our data.
The broader conjecture of the importance of the interaction eﬀect in all ﬁr m si sc o n ﬁrmed
in Models 7 and 8. We ﬁnd that disproportionality reduces ﬁrm value in all ﬁrms; however, the
eﬀect in ﬁrms where the controlling owner holds little cash ﬂow is signiﬁcantly larger. Thus,
whereas the average discount on ﬁrm value is around 14 percent for all ﬁrms, it is more than
17 percent (0.25 lower MB ratio around sample mean of 1.39 for ﬁrms with low cash ﬂow
concentration) in ﬁrms where the largest owner possesses little cash ﬂow. Model 8 interacts the
low cash ﬂow dummy with the degree of disproportionality. Although the interaction eﬀect is
negative, it is now statistically insigniﬁcant. In summary, Models 5 through 8 show that the
value discount on disproportional ownership structures is larger when ownership of cash ﬂow is
less concentrated.
3.5 Value discount and private beneﬁte x t r a c t i o n
Our model’s ﬁnal prediction relates to the value discount on disproportional ownership in in-
dustries characterized by high amenity value.
Proposition 5. Higher amenity value
a) increases the mitigating eﬀect of disproportional ownership on the incentive problem,
b) decreases the enhancing eﬀect of disproportional ownership on the entrenchment problem,
c) increases the negative eﬀect of a disproportional ownership structure on residual ﬁrm
value.
The ﬁrst part of the proposition yields that the positive eﬀect of disproportionality is larger
in industries with higher amenity values. Thus, for a given degree of disproportionality we shall
observe a lower managerial diversion in industries with high scope for private beneﬁte x t r a c t i o n .
The second part of the proposition yields that the negative eﬀect of disproportionality is larger in
industries with higher amenity values. Thus, for a given degree of disproportionality we expect
a larger owner diversion in industries with high amenity value. These two eﬀects have opposite
13impacts on residual ﬁrm value. The third part of the proposition shows that the negative eﬀect
in b) dominates the positive eﬀect in a). Empirically, Proposition 5 predicts a larger value
discount of disproportional ownership structures in industries characterized by high amenity
value, such as media, entertainment, and sport.
To test empirically Proposition 5, we follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and classify media,
sport and entertainment, and advertising as industries with high amenity value.16 In Panel D
of Table 3, we split the sample according to whether the ﬁrms are operating in such private
beneﬁts industries or not. In keeping with Proposition 5, we ﬁnd that the value discount of
disproportionality is more than twice as large in these industries as compared to the rest of the
sample.
Model 9 in Table 4 presents our cross-sectional test of Proposition 5. We add a dummy for
the private beneﬁti n d u s t r i e s(PBI) and notice that ﬁrms in these industries generally have lower
ﬁrm value. Again, we split the eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures into a general eﬀect
and an interaction eﬀect arising in private beneﬁt industries. The interaction eﬀect is large: ﬁrms
in private beneﬁt industries have an additional value discount associated with disproportional
ownership structures of 0.24. However, due to the low number of ﬁrms, the eﬀect is marginally
insigniﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.11. This insight is conﬁrmed in Model 10, where we interact
the private beneﬁt industry dummy with the degree of disproportionality.
To sum up, we conclude that ﬁrms with a disproportional relationship between cash ﬂow
and votes are valued lower by investors. In addition, we ﬁnd that the value discount is larger
in family-controlled ﬁrms, in ﬁrms where the controlling owner possesses little cash ﬂow, and in
industries with a higher potential for extraction of private beneﬁts. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the incentive and entrenchment story laid out in our simple model.
4 Additional Evidence on the Value Discount of Disproportional
Ownership Structure
4.1 The choice of mechanism: Dual class shares vs. pyramids
There are many diﬀerent mechanisms that can be used to generate additional power for con-
trolling owners. Dual class shares, chains of corporate ownerships (pyramids), cross-ownership,
and golden shares all create a wedge between owners’ possession of cash ﬂow and their inﬂuence
16Media includes SIC-codes: 2711, 2732, 2741, 7383, 7812, 7819, 7822, 7829 & 7832; sport and entertainment
is: 7911, 7922, 7929, 7933, 7941, 7948, 7991-3, 7996-7 & 7999; and advertising is: 7311, 7312, 7313, 7319.
14on ﬁrm management. From an analytical perspective, Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000)
show that any desired separation of ownership and control can be achieved through the use
of either dual class shares, or pyramids, or cross-ownership. However, these mechanisms may
serve several goals and yield diﬀerent implications on ﬁrm operation and, ultimately, on ﬁrm
value. For instance, dual class shares are frequently implemented in ﬁrms through initial public
oﬀerings (IPOs) or during successions in family ﬁrms, whereas a pyramidal structure is often
the result of ﬁrm acquisitions.
There are a number of theoretical contributions that analyze the consequences of dual class
shares with a focus on takeover based arguments (Grossman and Hart 1988, Harris and Raviv
1988, among others) and on non-takeover based arguments (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000).
There are few theoretical studies of pyramidal ownership. The main exception is Almeida and
Wolfenzon (2006), who analyze the dual question of why pyramids arise and what determines
the structure of a pyramid. Based on diﬀerences in cost of capital, they compare ﬁrm value of
an ownership structure based solely on dual class shares against ﬁrm value of a combination
of pyramids and dual class shares. Since ﬁrms self-select into the optimal choice of ownership
structure, their model does not predict that pyramids or dual class shares, as such, cause a
change in ﬁrm value.
Our model does not allow for the possibility that the choice of control enhancing mechanisms
aﬀects ﬁr mv a l u e .H o w e v e r ,i nt h el a s tc o l u m nw ec o m p a r et h ed i ﬀerence in the value discount
between ﬁrms with dual class shares and ﬁrms with pyramidal ownership structure, which are
the two most common mechanisms of separating control from cash ﬂow (see Table 1). Firms
using any of these mechanisms have a signiﬁcantly lower ﬁrm value; however, the value discount
on ﬁrms with dual class shares is more than twice as large as the value discount on ﬁrms that
are part of a corporate pyramid. The diﬀerence between these mechanisms is signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level. Panels B through E of this column show that the diﬀerence is economically
larger and statistically more signiﬁcant in non-family-controlled ﬁrms, in ﬁrms with low cash
ﬂow concentration, in industries with low amenity value, and in countries with high investor
protection.
Table 5 provides evidence of the impact of diﬀerent disproportionality mechanisms on ﬁrm
value. In Column 1 we use a dummy for each of the four groups of separating mechanisms. Dual
class shares has a large negative eﬀect, which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The ﬁrm value
of an average European ﬁrm with dual class shares is around 19 percent lower than the average
15ﬁrm with a proportional ownership structure. The value discount of dual class shares is indeed
higher and more signiﬁcant when ownership is less concentrated (Column 3) and in countries
with better protection against self-dealing (Column 4), whereas there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
for family-controlled ﬁrms (Column 2).
As is similar to the value discount of dual class shares, pyramids have a negative and statis-
tically signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm value in our sample. The estimated coeﬃcients are smaller than
those for dual class shares; however, the economic consequences are still large. On average, the
value of a European ﬁrm belonging to a corporate pyramid is around 8 percent lower than for
aE u r o p e a nﬁrm with a proportional ownership structure. The interaction eﬀects of pyramidal
structure with little ownership concentration, anti-self-dealing and family control are negative
but generally insigniﬁcant.
Dual class shares have a signiﬁcantly stronger negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value than pyramids.
Using an F-test, we strongly reject the null hypothesis that the eﬀects are identical. Hence, the
two coeﬃcients are both economically and statistically diﬀerent: the value discount of dual class
shares is twice as large as the value discount of pyramids.
The eﬀect of cross-holding is, on average, positive but insigniﬁcant.17 Finally, there are too
few ﬁrms with other mechanisms to get any signiﬁcant results for this group.
4.2 Interaction with investor protection
In the following analysis we are interested in how the value discount of disproportional ownership
structure interacts with investor protection.18 From a theoretical point of view, the positive
eﬀect of disproportionality (reducing the incentive problem) is reduced in countries with higher
investor protection, where managers generally divert fewer resources. Contrary to this, the
negative eﬀect of disproportionality (increasing the entrenchment problem) is small in countries
with high investor protection, as owners also will divert less. These two eﬀects have opposite
implications for residual ﬁrm value. It is, therefore, an open empirical question whether the
value discount on disproportional ownership should be higher or lower in countries with good
investor protection.
17One potential explanation for a positive impact of cross-ownership on ﬁrm value could be positive group
synergies when families control business groups. As a curiosity, we notice from Column 4 that the cross-ownership
eﬀect is much larger and statistically signiﬁcant in family ﬁrms.
18From an analytical point of view, Lins (2003) is the ﬁrst paper to address empirically the issue of substitution
or complementary eﬀects between ownership structure and legal systems. Lins (2003) shows that the impact of
managerial control and non-managerial block holding is larger in countries with lower investor protection.
16Panels E and F of Table 3 show the interaction eﬀects between investor protection and the
value discount on disproportional ownership structures. We focus on the revised anti-director
rights index (Panel E) and the aggregated anti-self-dealing index (Panel F) from Djankov et al.
(2008). We split the sample into high and low investor protection countries according to the
median score on the country level. In both panels we notice that the value discount associated
with disproportional ownership structures is higher in countries with high investor protection.
Moreover, the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in countries with high investor
protection, whereas there is no discount in countries with low investor protection.
Table 6 provides multivariate evidence on the eﬀect of investor protection.19 To simplify
the presentation of the results, we do not report the control variables, which are identical to
the ones used throughout the analysis. We start by including the interaction of the anti-self-
dealing index with the disproportionality dummy. The interaction eﬀect is negative and highly
signiﬁcant, whereas disproportionality becomes positive and insigniﬁcant. Thus, the negative
eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures decreases (i.e., becomes stronger) with the level
of investor protection, but is insigniﬁcant in countries with low levels of investor protection.
A simple F-test of the net eﬀect shows that the discount is signiﬁcant for countries with an
anti-self-dealing index above 0.45.20 In Model 5 of Table 6, we interact disproportionality with
the revised anti-director rights index, and ﬁnd similar results. The interaction eﬀect is negative
and highly signiﬁcant, whereas disproportionality becomes positive and marginally insigniﬁcant.
A simple F-test of the net eﬀect reveals that the negative eﬀect sets in when the anti-director
rights score is 3.5 or higher, whereas the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant for scores below this level.21
Table 6 also provides additional institutional details on the relationship between investor
protection and the disproportionality discount. Columns 2 and 3 report regressions based on
the interaction between two subcomponents of the anti-self-dealing index and disproportional
ownership. We notice that both ex ante and ex post measures are signiﬁcant, but that the ex
19Note that our basic regression model includes a ﬁxed country eﬀect and, therefore, already controls for the
direct eﬀect of the level of legal investor protection, since it is constant within each country. In unreported
regression, we have excluded the ﬁxed-country eﬀects and have included alternatively the direct measure of
investor protection. Our results are not aﬀected in any meaningful way. All results in Table 6 are also robust
toward the measure of disproportionality, since identical results are obtained (but not reported) when investor
protection indices are interacted with the degree of disproportionality.
20The F-test of the net eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures with an self-dealing index of 0.45 yields
a F-statistic of 3.37, which is signiﬁc a n ta tt h e1 0p e r c e n tl e v e l ,w h e r e a st h eF - v a l u ew h e nt h es c o r ee q u a l s0 . 5i s
6.04, which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
21The F-test of the net eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures with an anti-director rights score of 3
yields a F-statistic of 1.08, which is grossly insigniﬁcant, whereas the F-value when the score equals 3.5 is 6.70,
which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
17post estimate is slightly more so.22 The fourth model uses the public enforcement measure from
Djankov et al. (2008), which rates the level of punishment that potentially can be imposed
on controlling owners and/or managers violating the legal barriers to self-dealing. Public en-
forcement and anti-self-dealing initiatives are, to a large extent, substitutes, implying that these
measures are highly negatively correlated (correlation coeﬃcient of -0.56). Not surprisingly, the
interaction term in Model 4 is positive and signiﬁcant.
Models 6 to 10 of Table 6 introduce interaction terms with the components of the revised
anti-director rights.23 Vote by mail, shares not deposited, oppressed minority,a n dcapital all
enter with a negative sign and are statistically signiﬁcant. The interaction with cumulative
voting is positive but insigniﬁcant.
The economic impact of disproportional ownership structures is larger in countries with high
values of our two indices: in the U.K., Ireland, and Scandinavia, which are the countries that
top the two indices, we observe that the discount on ﬁrms with a disproportional ownership
structure corresponds to around 20 percent of ﬁrm value. Our analysis thus indicates that
disproportional ownership structures and investor protection are, to some extent, substitute
governance mechanisms: When investor protection is inadequate, the beneﬁt of disproportional
ownership structures is as large as the cost. However, when investor protection is high, then the
increased entrenchment problem dominates, implying that there is a signiﬁcant value discount
associated with disproportional ownership structures.
4.3 Disproportionality and alternative measures of corporate performance
The analysis has so far focused on the impact of disproportionality on ﬁrm value. As Adams
and Ferreira (2008) point out, there are very few attempts in the prior literature to analyze
the eﬀect of disproportionality on alternative measures of performance. In this section, we,
therefore, provide novel insights into whether the documented lower ﬁrm value coincides with
poor operating performance, diﬀerences in payout policy, or low growth rates.
Table 7 shows the impact of disproportionality on alternative measures of ﬁrm performance.
We begin the discussion by focusing on the odd-numbered columns, which show that there
is limited overall eﬀect of disproportionality on alternative performance measures. Column 1
22The ex ante measure focuses on disclosure requirements and the ability to call for independent review of
certain actions. The ex post measure focuses on the ability to sue controlling agents, information access, and
ability to hold agents liable. See Djankov et al. (2008) for details.
23The anti-director rights index summarizes six provisions of investor protection. However, within our sample
of European countries there is no variation in preemptive rights, as all fourteen countries mandate this by law.
18shows that the eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures disappears when we use return on
assets (operating proﬁts over book value of assets) as our endogenous variable. Another, and
perhaps a more drastic measure of operating performance, is the likelihood of going bankrupt.
In Column 3 we utilize the ﬁrm status variable to construct an indicator variable taking the
value one if the ﬁrm went bankrupt before 2005. Thus, the dependent variable in Column 3 is
the indicator for bankruptcy. We examine the probability of bankruptcy in a logit model, which
allows ﬁxed country eﬀects. We ﬁnd a negative correlation between disproportional ownership
and the probability of going bankrupt, although the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant.
Although we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the operating performance of proportional and
disproportional ﬁrms, the value discount can still be explained by diﬀerences in the payout policy.
Column 5 examines whether ﬁrms with disproportional ownership have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
payout policy. We measure the payout policy by the dividend yield, which is the dividend per
s h a r eo v e rt h ep r i c ep e rs h a r e . T h ec o e ﬃcient on disproportional ownership is positive, but
insigniﬁcant.
Finally, Columns 7, 9, and 11 focus on ﬁrm growth measured by the ﬁve-year growth (from
1998 to 2002) in sales, assets, and number of employees. Thus, growth in, for instance, sales
is calculated as the percentage growth in sales over the ﬁve-year period from 1998 to 2002.
In general, we ﬁnd that disproportional ownership structures are negatively correlated with
growth–although most coeﬃcients are grossly insigniﬁcant. The main exception is growth in
assets, where we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect driven by ﬁrms with dual class shares, which
we discuss below.
It is interesting that we ﬁnd strong signiﬁcant value discounts without any signiﬁcant ef-
fects on alternative performance measures. One potential explanation for this diﬀerence is that
controlling owners might extract a disproportional part of the surplus in the ﬁrms they control
after operations have been carried out. In this case, potential outside investors will still require
a discount for investing in the ﬁrm, even though the entrenchment problem does not aﬀect
corporate performance. Another possibility is that the results on ﬁrm value are biased. This
possibility highlights the importance of our empirical strategy. To this end, we address speciﬁc
endogeneity stories related to omitted variable bias, measurement bias, and reverse causality in
the following section.
Next we turn to the even numbered columns, which focus on speciﬁc control enhancing
mechanisms. Column 2 shows that ﬁrms with pyramidal ownership have signiﬁcantly higher
19return on assets than other ﬁrms. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant on a 5 percent level. However, this
eﬀect does not show up when we use bankruptcy as our performance measure in Column 4.
Column 6 yields that pyramidal ﬁrms pay higher dividends and that this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at
a 5 percent level.
Columns 8, 10, and 12 show again that most mechanisms have a negative sign with respect
to our three growth variables but that these eﬀects are insigniﬁcant. The only exception is
that dual class share ﬁr m sh a v el e s sg r o w t hi na s s e t s . T h i se ﬀect is signiﬁcant at a 1 percent
level. This observation is consistent with the notion that family ﬁrms–which are overrepresented
among ﬁrms with disproportional ownership structures–pursue less growth through acquisition.
Family ﬁrm scholars have emphasized that it often is harder for family-controlled ﬁrms to rely
on external capital because this may imply that the family has to give up control. Thus, family
ﬁrms have to rely more on retained earnings as a means to ﬁnance growth activities.
To sum up, we have shown in Section 4 that the value discount associated with dual class
shares is signiﬁcantly higher than the value discount associated with pyramidal ownership. We
believe that the evidence in the last two sections provides part of the explanation for why
these mechanisms are valuated diﬀerently. We have shown that dual class share ﬁrms are less
frequently traded, have worse operating performance, pay out fewer dividends, and have lower
growth in assets relative to pyramidal ﬁrms. All of these four features make dual class shares
less valuable for the marginal investor.
5 Endogeneity issues
Despite the fact that endogeneity of ownership concentration has been debated since Demsetz
and Lehn (1985), to our knowledge only two papers have attempted to instrument dispropor-
tionality. Lins (2003) uses ﬁrm beta to instrument ownership concentration, whereas Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2008) use seven proxies for private beneﬁts of control: family name, state
laws, three measures of local market share, active founders proxied by sales, and proﬁtr a n k ,
measured at the time of the IPO to instrument ownership concentration. This approach is clever,
as the speciﬁcation beneﬁt forms the time separation in the measurement of instruments and
outcomes.
A good instrument must, in our case, a) be correlated with ownership concentration, and
b) uncorrelated with ﬁrm performance. We question whether these conditions are satisﬁed.
CAPM provides a direct link from beta to ﬁrm performance measured by the expected return.
20Thus, beta cannot be excluded in the performance regression. Pecuniary private beneﬁts of
control must have a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm performance as controlling owners are extracting
corporate resources. If dual class shares serve as a remedy to help controlling owners extract
pecuniary private beneﬁts, private beneﬁts will correlate with ownership concentration, but not
be exclusive in the second stage. Thus, to serve as a good instrument, private beneﬁts have
to be non-pecuniary; however, even assuming this, we contest that the seven instruments used
in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008) qualify as good instruments. A major problem with
the identiﬁcation in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008) is that few of their instruments are
signiﬁcantly correlated with ownership concentration in the ﬁrst stage regression. IV estimates
are therefore likely to be biased toward the OLS estimates (Angrist and Kruger 2001). Moreover,
as noted by Staiger and Stock (1997), the weak instrument problem makes the over-identiﬁcation
tests, provided by the authors to bolster the exogeneity of the instruments in the second state,
misleading.
In summary, we ascribe to the conclusion of Angrist and Kruger (2001) that, without a valid
instrument, IV-analysis is inappropriate as the association between the instrumental variable,
and omitted variables can lead to a bias in the resulting estimates that is much greater than the
bias in ordinary least-squares estimates. Given a lack of qualiﬁed instruments for IV analysis, we
instead turn to the alternative, which is to address three speciﬁc types of endogeneity problems:
omitted variables; measurement errors; and, reverse causality. As each of these speciﬁcs t o r i e s
potentially can explain the correlation with ﬁrm value, this section will provide a novel insight
to bolster the interpretation of the value discount being related to incentive and entrenchment
eﬀects.
5.1 Omitted variables
A. Protection against uninvited takeovers
In our regressions we do not explicitly take into account the fact that disproportionality might
function as a defense against uninvited takeovers. For this omitted variable to explain the
observed valuation discount, we can assume that there is a ﬁxed private beneﬁt to controlling
owners which is unaﬀected by the ownership structure. Moreover, in the event of an uninvited
takeover, any premium is paid out based on the distribution of cash ﬂow. Finally, we assume that
the likelihood of a successful uninvited takeover is decreasing in the degree of disproportionality,
since the controlling owner’s incentive to ﬁght oﬀ the attempt to protect the private beneﬁts of
21control is increasing in her share of votes. In such a setting, a minority investor will pay less
for shares in ﬁrms with a disproportional ownership structure, since the expected gain from a
future uninvited takeover is smaller. Even though we do acknowledge this theoretical channel
through which the value discount can be explained, we reject it on empirical grounds, since it is
inconsistent with at least three observations in our data:
The ﬁrst observation is that this explanation is less powerful empirically than the agency
explanation. The takeover argument implies that the value discount should be higher in in-
dustries or countries with active takeover markets. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, we include
an interaction with the level of takeover activity, M&A volume, in each industry and in each
country. Following Rossi and Volpin (2004), we construct M&A volume, such that it measures
the volume of the mergers and acquisition activity by the percentage of traded ﬁrms that were
targets of successful mergers and acquisitions from 1998 to 2005. We construct the measure on
both industry and country level. In Column 1 we ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect of disproportional
ownership is independent of the level of M&A activity at the industry level. In Column 2, where
we interact the disproportionality dummy with M&A volume on country level, the sign on the in-
teraction term is negative and signiﬁcant at a 5 percent level. This indicates that countries with
higher takeover activity have a larger value discount associated with disproportional ownership.
To measure the relative impact of our two channels, we set up a horse race between the agency
and the takeover explanations in Column 3, where we include both anti-director rights index
and takeover activity and interact these with disproportionality. Notice that the anti-director
rights eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, whereas the takeover eﬀect is insigniﬁcant at any
conventional level. Column 4 yields similar results when we include both industry and country
level takeover activity and investor protection.24 We conclude that the agency channel clearly
wins the horse race.
The second observation is that the takeover explanation is inconsistent with our ﬁndings
regarding family-controlled ﬁrms. The incentive/entrenchment argument predicts that the dis-
proportionality discount is higher in family-controlled ﬁr m st h a ni nn o n - f a m i l yﬁrms (Proposition
3 in our model), which we show empirically in Tables 3 and 4. The takeover argument predicts
the opposite. To see this, we compare a family-controlled with a non-family-controlled ﬁrm for
a given takeover pressure and ownership structure. Everything else being equal, we expect the
24Similar results are obtained (but not reported) in a horse race, where we include both the anti-self-dealing
index and takeover activity and interact these with the disproportionality variable.
22family ﬁrm to be better protected than the non-family ﬁrm against uninvited takeovers. This
has two important eﬀects: family ﬁrms should generally have lower ﬁrm value, and the value
discount related to disproportional ownership structures should be smaller. Both of these eﬀects
are inconsistent with the evidence in Tables 3 and 4, where we show that family ﬁrms have higher
ﬁrm value and, more importantly, that the value discount related to disproportional ownership
structures is larger in family-owned and -managed ﬁrms.
Column 5 of Table 8 reﬁnes this argument by restricting the sample to ﬁrms in countries
with an active takeover market (deﬁned as higher activity than the median M&A activity on
country level).25 As family ﬁrms are well protected against takeovers, we should not expect to
see any eﬀect of disproportional ownership structures if the value discount is driven by a takeover
premium on ﬁrms with proportional ownership. In this subsample we ﬁnd that disproportionality
is still associated with an economically large and statistically signiﬁcant discount on ﬁrm value.
More importantly, we ﬁnd that disproportionality in family ﬁrms increases this discount further.
The ﬁnal observation is that the premise of the takeover channel, that ﬁrms with proportional
ownership structures are more active in mergers and acquisition, does not hold. To see this, we
perform a direct test of this premise in Columns 6 through 9. Our ownership data is from 1996
through 1998, and we have collected data for the status of our ﬁrms in 2005. Thus, we know
whether the ﬁrms in question have merged or been acquired during the last decade. In Column
6 we examine whether ﬁrms with a disproportional ownership structure are less active on the
takeover market than ﬁrms with proportional ownership structure. We run a logit regression
with an indicator variable for status as merged or acquired as the endogenous variable. In
total, 27 percent of the ﬁrms either merged or were acquired before 2005. Interestingly, the
likelihood of being merged or acquired is higher for ﬁrms with disproportional ownership. The
coeﬃcient corresponds to a marginal eﬀect of 3.75 percent in the probability of merging or being
acquired. Moreover, the eﬀect is signiﬁcant at a 1 percent level. We conﬁrm this in Column
8, where the dependent variable is an indicator taking the value one if the ﬁrm was acquired.
The marginal eﬀect of disproportional ownership on the probability of being acquired is 3.2
percentage points relative to a baseline probability of being acquired of 22.2 percent. Hence,
ﬁrms with disproportional ownership structures are more active on the takeover market than
ﬁrms with proportional ownership structures, which is exactly the opposite of the premise of the
missing takeover premium argument.
25This takes care of the situation where most family ﬁrms are located in countries with low takeover activity.
23Although the missing takeover premium argument cannot explain the general value discount;
it may provide some explanation of why dual class shares are valued lower than pyramids. In
Column 7 we investigate how the individual mechanisms correlate with the likelihood of being
merged or acquired. We notice a strong diﬀerence between dual class shares and pyramids. The
eﬀect of dual class shares on M&A probability is negative but insigniﬁcant, whereas the eﬀect
of pyramids is positive and very signiﬁcant. This diﬀerence corresponds to that the likelihood
of a merger or takeover is 13.3 percentage points higher for pyramids as compared to dual class
s h a r e s .T h i si sc o n ﬁrmed in Column 9, where we focus on only acquired ﬁrms. Thus, the larger
expected takeover premium may be one explanation for why pyramids are valued higher than
dual class shares.
In sum, the missing takeover premium cannot explain the general value discount of dispro-
portional ownership structures. However, we believe that it can provide some explanation of
why the value discount is higher for dual class shares than for pyramidal ownership structures.
B. Protection of private beneﬁts
Disproportionality can have a negative impact on the marginal investor’s willingness to pay when
the ownership structure determines the distribution of private beneﬁts. Zingales (1995a) assumes
that the amount of private beneﬁtt h a tc a nb ed i v e r t e di sﬁxed, but that the distribution of
private beneﬁt among the owners is determined by the ownership structure. Disproportionality
implies that non-controlling owners expect to receive a smaller share of the private beneﬁt and,
therefore, will pay less for the stock. In a similar vein, Bebchuk (1999) and Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2008) show that disproportionality instruments are more frequently used whenever
private beneﬁts of control are high.
This argument is consistent with our evidence that the value discount is higher when owners
have little cash ﬂow and when potential private beneﬁts are higher. However, it is inconsistent
with the evidence that the value discount is higher in family ﬁrms and in countries with higher
investor protection. Protection of private beneﬁts implies that the value discount will be smaller
in family ﬁrms, where the private beneﬁt is well protected within the family even in the absence
of disproportional ownership structure. As argued above, the entrenchment story would predict
a higher value discount, since the incentive problems are smaller. The evidence in Models 3 and
4 in Table 4 is clearly in favor of our interpretation: disproportional ownership structures are
associated with a higher value discount in family ﬁrms.
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